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ABSTRACT 
Latin America is well known as the most inequitable region. As it is recognized, inequality and corruption 
perception weaken the way that political institutions works and the democratic system. Focusing on Latin 
American and Caribbean countries, we analyze what are the elements that shape tax morale. In particular, we 
analyze how the context influences on ethic decisions such as the predisposition to pay taxes. Our data source 
is the survey carried out in 2005 by Latinobarometro.
In particular, our objective is to analyze how country performance is determining tax morale. To do so, we 
estimated four probit models including Gini index, Transparency International Corruption Perception Index and 
Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPpc). 
As expected we found that some socio-demographic variables play a relevant role. Interestingly, we also found 
that, in this attitude, LAC countries do not register a gender bias. However, those are not our main 
contributions to the literature on the field. The most important results are linked with: 1) the level matters, 
GDPpc increases the probability that people have tax morale, 2) moreover, income distribution also influence 
on tax morale but in opposite direction and 3) corruption perception also reduces tax morale. Those results 
show that the quality of institutions matters and therefore, the way that democracy works play a relevant role.   
RESUMEN 
América Latina es bien conocida como la región con mayor desigualdad. Como es sabido, la inequidad y la 
percepción de corrupción debilitan la forma en que las instituciones políticas trabajan, así como al sistema 
democrático. Centrando la atención en los países de América Latina y el Caribe, se analiza cuales son los 
elementos que determinan la moral fiscal. Particularmente, se analiza cómo el contexto repercute sobre las 
decisiones éticas, como ser, la predisposición a pagar impuestos. La base de taos proviene de la encuesta 
Latinobarómetro 2005.  
En particular, el objetivo es analizar cómo el desempeño de los países determina la moral fiscal. Con tal 
finalidad se estiman cuatro modelos probit incluyendo el índice de Gini, el índice de percepción de corrupción 
de Transparencia Internacional y el producto per cápita. 
Como se esperaba, se encuentra que algunas variables socioeconómicas juegan un rol fundamental. 
Sorprendentemente, no se encuentras diferencias por género. Sin embargo, estas no son las contribuciones 
principales del trabajo. Los resultados más importantes se relacionan con el hecho que: 1) el nivel importa, el 
mayor producto per capita incrementa la probabilidad de que el individuo tenga moral fiscal, 2) más aun, la 
distribución del ingreso también influencia la moral fiscal, pero en la dirección opuesta, y 3) la percepción de la 
corrupción reduce la moral fiscal. Estos resultados muestran la calidad de las instituciones importa, y que, por 
lo tanto, la forma en que la democracia funcione juega un rol importante.   
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Introduction 
Values, tastes, expectations and consequently individual’s decisions are influenced by the context. 
Therefore, comparative research could not ignore context effects; in particular when analyzing 
individuals´ behaviors with respect to the law (Bergman and Nevarez, 2005).           
There from, we are interested in analyzing what elements shape tax morale as a proxy of 
individual’s ethic behavior. We expect that some individual characteristics play a relevant role. 
However, our main contribution is based on analyzing how inequality and the perceived quality of 
institutions affect the probability of behaving in accordance with the law regarding evading or not 
taxes.   
For tax morale we understand the individuals’ intrinsic motivation to pay taxes, which is treated as a 
“black box” by most of the studies on the subject, considering it as a residual in the analysis of tax 
evasion (Feld and Frey, 2002).  
Given this definition, we found, as previous literature, that some socio-demographic characteristics 
play a relevant role, as well as aspects related with trust, democracy and national pride (Azar et al., 
2008). However, our main contribution to the literature on this field is based on showing the 
influence of the context. In particular, we found that corruption perception, Gross Domestic Product 
per capita and inequality do shape people decisions towards paying taxes. Therefore, we can 
conclude that institutions, equity and the way that democracy works make the difference.  
1. Background 
Analyzing the decisions regarding whether or not evading an income tax, Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) found that evasion will depend on the expected savings resulting from the evasion, the 
probability of being caught and the magnitude of the monetary sanction in case of being caught.  
Some other studies extend this analysis including other characteristics such as cooperation among 
taxpayers to evade (Boadway, Marceau and Mongrain, 2002), the corruption in the public 
administration (Polinsky and Shavell, 2001) or variables related to the compliance with formal and 
informal rules and the way in which the tax authority recognizes taxpayers’ rights and 
characteristics (Feld et al., 2002).  
Nevertheless, these works predict levels of compliance that are lower than those actually observed, 
so the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes is gaining more importance in the literature than the levels of 
compliance (Alm and Togler, 2004; Martinez-Vázquez and Togler, 2005; Schneider and Torgler, 
2004; Torgler, 2005; and Torgler, 2001).    3
Alm and Torgler (2004), through the use of data from the World Value Survey (1990 and 1995) for 
United States and 15 European countries, show the importance of social and cultural variables. The 
higher level of tax morale was found in the case of United States (above Austria and Switzerland). 
They also found that some socio-demographics characteristics matters and the same is true in the 
case of context (trust in the legal system and parliament and level of financial satisfaction). At the 
same time, they find a strong negative correlation between tax morale and the size of the formal 
sector. In the same line, Schneider and Torgler (2004) analyzing the cases of Belgium, Spain and 
Switzerland found that intra-national cultural differences have a significant impact on the level of tax 
morale. 
Focusing on fiscal policies implications of tax morale, Schaltegger and Torgler (2005), found that 
taxpayers’ attitudes are significantly influenced, among other factors, by the government’s decisions 
in the field of tax policies and by the authorities’ behavior. The effects of tax systems, public 
expenditure, effectiveness of tax administration and the total amount of taxes, are aspects that play 
a relevant role.  
In light of these previous researches, our objective is to analyze whether an environment with high 
levels of corruption and/ or inequality leads to a decline in the tax morale. 
2.  Data and Methodology 
The data source is the Latinobarometro survey carried out in all Latin American countries in 2005. 
The intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (tax morale, tm) is captured through the question: “Within a 1 to 
10 scale, where 1 means “not at all justifiable” and 10 means “totally justifiable”, how much 
justifiable do you think tax evading is?” For ease of reading we inverted the answers order in a way 
that 1 corresponds to the lower level of tax morale and 10 to the highest and with the aim of taking 
into account the highest levels of tax morale we construct the binary variable tm in the following 
way: tm equals 1 if respondent indicates 9 or 10 and 0 in other case.
†
Table 1 shows the distribution of answers to this question and Table 2 presents definitions as well 
as descriptive statistics of the independent variables.   
Insert table 1: distribution of answers 
Insert table 2: description of independent variables 
† This is the case because 8.3 is the mean and 8 the median.   4
Given our objective and our binary dependent variable, we estimate probit models and in order to 
measure the impact of significant independent variables we also compute the marginal effects. 
3. Results 
Table 3 shows the estimated probit model and in order to measure the impact of significant 
independent variables on tax morale, we also compute the marginal effects that are presented in 
table 4. In particular, this table shows the change in the probability of having tax morale given a 
change in one of the independent variables. 
Insert Table 3: The models 
Insert Table 4: Marginal effects 
Firstly, as could be seen in table 4, there are no changes in significance or sign and table 4 shows 
that in all cases, the probability that a person has tax morale is 50.4%. 
As expected some socio-demographic characteristics matters.  
We found that all the included age groups are significant at 1% and more important we found that 
tax morale increases with age. As table 4 shows, the change in the probability of having tax morale 
is always positive and it increases as the person changes between groups. While belonging to the 
first group increases the probability almost 7 percent points (pp), having between 41 and 60 years 
old raises the probability almost 14 pp. This is consistent with previous literature (as Azar et al., 
2008) that states that older people is more sensitive to sanctions or to the shame of being caught in 
an illegal activity. The aim of not harming social status which was attained with the passage of the 
years is a cost that people may take into account.
The same is true in the case of years of schooling. We found a significant difference between the 
lowest level and all included levels and as before the change in the probability becomes higher as 
years of education increases (the change ranges between 2.2 pp and 9.3 pp).  
However, the higher an individual place himself/ herself in the income scale, the lower the 
probability of having tax morale. In this case, probability changes between 1.5 pp and 1.8 pp. This 
result implies that the cost of legality is inversely proportional to an individual’s income. Moreover, it 
is consistent with some reforms in Latin American countries regarding tax structures. In particular, 
with the purpose of improving equity, some countries change tax systems trying that richer people 5
pay more taxes. Those reforms may strengthen tax evader’s incentives of avoiding to pay taxes and 
this effect could be higher in the case of rich people.   
Regarding religious groups and religiosity, we found that attendance to religious services makes no 
differences in attitudes towards tax morale. However, those people who identify with Roman 
Catholic religion are more likely to have less tax morale; in this case the probability reduces, on 
average, 2.8 pp. This result is consistent with Weber’s thesis; we might expect that there are 
significant differences among religious groups on this direction. He argued that for example, the 
culture of Protestantism would have left an enduring legacy in values that still remain visible today. 
Moreover Weber stresses that an important aspect of Protestantism concerns the teaching of 
broader ethical standards, including those of honesty, willingness to obey the law, and 
trustworthiness, which serve as the foundation of business confidence, good faith dealings, and 
voluntary contract compliance. 
We also found that self-employed people are more likely to have less tax morale, in this case the 
probability reduces between 1.8 and 2.8 pp. It might be possible that self-employed people are 
exposed to more incidents of corrupted actions, as well as the fact that they suffer more directly and 
are more conscious of the tax burden. However, we found that there are no significant differences 
between those working for a private enterprise or in the public sector.  
Moreover, we found that gender, marital status and being unemployed do not influence tax morale. 
Our models also show that context affects decision-making process and tax morale.  
In order to capture income level effects among countries, model 1 includes GDPpc. As expected, It 
was found that this variable makes a significant difference and it is worth noting that its impact is 
relatively high, 11.2 pp. Moreover, we include the logarithm of the variable so the result implies that 
people who live in those countries that grow faster are more likely to have tax morale.  
GDPpc is highly correlated with GINI index and Transparency International Corruption Perception 
Index (TI), but in opposite direction. Therefore, model 2-4 focus on those variables and do not 
include GDPpc. 
Models 2 to 4 show that inequality and the level of corruption matters.  
According to TI ranking, the lower the level of corruption perception, the higher a country is placed 
and we found that the probability of having tax morale increases as the country improves its 
position. This result is consistent with Cábelková (2001) findings. The incentives to take corrupt 6
actions are affected by individual perception about the level of corruption and the authority’s level of 
tolerance. This perception may affect both the demand and supply of corrupt actions. In countries 
where corruption is systemic it cannot be assumed that the obligation of paying taxes is an 
accepted social norm. Corruption generally undermines the tax morale of the citizens, because they 
get frustrated (Torgler, 2004). 
On the other hand, inequality plays a relevant role in shaping tax morale but in opposite sense. We 
found that Gini Index is significant and in this case, the probability reduces. Therefore equity 
improves tax morale. With the increased inequality, the rich, as a class or as interest group, can use 
lobbying, political contributions or bribery to influence law-implementing processes and to buy 
favorable interpretations of the law. This process worsens institutions performance and democratic 
systems. 
Model 2 shows that the probability of having tax morale reduces 6.7 pp as GINI index decreases 
and according to model 3 this probability reduces 4.5 pp when corruption perception lowers. 
Given those results, we estimated model 4, in this model we included both GINI index and TI. It is 
worth noting that both variables are significant and the sign remains. However, we found that taking 
into account both the changes in the probability in absolute value, inequality plays the most relevant 
role: the net effect is negative. 
Finally, those results confirm that policy-makers decisions are also important in order to improve the 
quality of institutions and income distributions. 
4. Conclusions 
With the aim of analyzing how country performance influence on morale at individual level, we focus 
on the predisposition to avoid paying taxes and the incidence of some key variables on this attitude. 
As it was expected, there are a set of individual characteristics that play relevant role (age, years of 
schooling, income scale, being self-employed and religious denomination). Regarding those results, 
we conclude that the asymmetries of rules make a significant difference; they reduce the probability 
of having tax morale. However, social status influence on people’s attitudes and its impact is higher.  
Latin American and Caribbean countries show gender biases in several issues related to culture 
and morale views. However, we found that there is no significant difference in attitudes between 
women and men.  7
We also found that context is determinant in shaping people attitudes and that there is room for the 
improvement of the quality of institutions and in particular, the democratic system.  
Firstly, GDP per capita influence people’s tax morale. The probability of having tax morale 
increases 11.2 pp. People who live in those countries that grow faster are more likely to have tax 
morale.  
Secondly, we found that the probability of having tax morale increases 4.5 pp as the country 
improves its position in TI, Corruption Perception Index. Therefore, avoiding paying taxes is less 
costly when individual’s perception of corruption is high and/ or the authority’s level of tolerance is 
also high. 
Thirdly, inequality also plays a relevant role in shaping tax morale but in opposite sense. We found 
that inequality reduces tax morale (the probability reduces 5.4 pp). With the increased inequality, 
the rich, as a class or as interest group, can use lobbying, political contributions or bribery to 
influence law-implementing processes and to buy favorable interpretations of the law. This process 
worsens institutions performance and democratic systems. 
Finally, the joint effect of the quality of institutions and inequality is negative. Therefore, the latter is 
more important than the former. So, there is room for pro-active government role. 8
References 
Allingham, M. G. and Sandmo, A. (1972), “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis”, Journal of 
Public Economics I, 323-338. 
Alm, J. and Torlger, B. (2004), “Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the Unites States and in 
Europe”, CREMA WP 2004 - 14. 
Azar, K., Gerstenblüth, M. and Rossi, M. (2008), “Moral Fiscal en el Cono Sur”, Department of 
Economics working paper 0208, State University, Uruguay. 
Bergman, M. and Nevarez, A. (2005), “¿Evadir o pagar impuestos? Una aproximación a los 
mecanismos sociales del cumplimiento”, Política y Gobierno, Vol. XII, 1. 
Boadway, R., Marceau, N. and Mongrain, S. (2002), “Joint tax evasion”, Canadian Journal of 
Economics vol. 35: 417-435. 
Cábelková, I. (2001). “Perceptions of Corruption in Ukraine: Are they correct?” CERGE-EI, WP 176. 
Latinobarometer Corporation: questionnaire 2005. 
Feld, L. P. and Frey B. S. (2002), “Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers are Treated”, Economics of 
Governance, Vol. 3, 87-99. 
Martinez-Vazquez, J. and Torgler, B. (2005), “The Evolution of Tax Morale in Modern Spain”, 
CREMA, WP 2005 - 33. 
Polinsky, M. and Shavell, S. (2001), “Corruption and optimal law enforcement”, Journal of Public 
Economics vol. 81: 1-24. 
Schaltegger, C. A. and Torgler, B. (2005), “Tax Morale and Fiscal Policy”, CREMA, WP 2005 - 30. 
Schneider, F. and Torgler, B. (2004), “Does Culture Influence Tax Morale? Evidence from Different 
European Countries”, CREMA WP 2004 - 17. 
Torgler, B. (2001). “What Do We Know about Tax Morale and Tax Compliance?” RISEC: 
International Review of Economics and Business, XLVIII: 395-419. 
Torlger, B. (2004), “Tax Morale, Trust and Corruption: Empirical Evidence from Transition 
Countries”, CREMA WP 2004 - 05. 
Torgler, B. (2005), “Tax Morale in Latin America”, Public Choice, vol. 122, 1: 133-157. 
Weber, M. (1930), “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism”. Talcott Parsons. New York, 
Scribner's Sons. 9
Annex – Tables 
Table 1 










0 if respondent  indicates something between 1 and 8
1 if respondent indicates 9 or 10 
Do not answer/ do not know10 
Table 2 
Description of independent variables 
Area Variable  Values  Mean 
Educa1  1 if respondent completed primary school (omitted)   0 .503 
Educa2  1 if respondent did not finish secondary school   0.175 
Educa3  1 if respondent completed secondary school   0.178 
Educa4  1 if respondent did not finish university studies   0.079 
Human Capital 
Educa5  1 if respondent completed university studies  0.065 
Norelig  1 if respondent does not attend to religious services  0.114  Religion and 
religiosity  Catholic  1 if respondent identifies with Roman Catholic  0.720 
Income  Incscale  Self-placement in 10 point income scale  3.720 
Unemp  1 if unemployed    0.066 
Inactive  1 if inactive (omitted)  0.362  
Public  1 if working in public sector    0.073 
Private  1 if working in a private enterprise    0.172 
Labor market 
Selfemp  1 if being self-employed   0.328   
Woman  1 being a woman   0.510 
Age18-25  1 if respondent’s age is between 18 and 25 years old (omitted)   0.249 
Age26-40  1 if respondent’s age is between 26 and 40 years old   0.348 
Age41-60  1 if respondent’s age is between 41 and 60 years old   0.271 
Age61+  1 if respondent’s age is 61 years old or more   0.132 




Divorced  1 if divorced  or widowed   0.116 
GINI 
1 if Gini Index is lower than percentile 25 
2 if Gini Index is between percentile 25 and 75 
3 if Gini Index is higher than percentile 75 
(p25 = 0.505 and p75 = 0.579) 
0.538 
GDPpc   Logarithm of Gross Domestic Product, Atlas method (current US$)  8.670 
Others variables 
TI
Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index (CPI, 2004) 
1 if CPI is lower than percentile 25 
2 if CPI is between percentile 25 and 75 
3 if CPI is higher than percentile 75 




Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
tm tm tm tm 
Age  18-25  0.169*** 0.180*** 0.184*** 0.173*** 
    [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] 
Age  26-40  0.250*** 0.272*** 0.271*** 0.255*** 
    [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] 
Age  41-60  0.336*** 0.363*** 0.356*** 0.338*** 
    [0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041] 
Woman  -0.027 -0.024 -0.027 -0.024 
    [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] 
Educa2 0.082***  0.079***  0.076**  0.059** 
    [0.029] [0.029] [0.030] [0.030] 
Educa3  0.092*** 0.118*** 0.111*** 0.107*** 
    [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] 
Educa4  0.178*** 0.158*** 0.172*** 0.162*** 
    [0.041] [0.040] [0.041] [0.041] 
Educa5  0.228*** 0.235*** 0.227*** 0.233*** 
    [0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044] 
Married  0.021 0.025 0.018 0.024 
    [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] 
Divorced  0.032 0.053 0.046 0.047 
    [0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041] 
Selfemp -0.046*  -0.071***  -0.053**  -0.048* 
    [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] 
Public  0.017 0.018 0.034 0.035 
    [0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041] 
Unemp  -0.047 -0.039 -0.051 -0.042 
    [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] 
Incscale  -0.046*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.040*** 
    [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Norelig -0.006  0.033  0.017  0.004 
    [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] 
Catholic -0.089***  -0.075***  -0.044*  -0.053** 
    [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] 
GDPpc 0.280*** 
   [0.024] 
GINI     -0.167***     -0.136*** 
   [0.014]     [0.015] 
TI    0.113***  0.095*** 
   [0.009]  [0.009] 
Constant -2.389***  0.302***  -0.299***  0.033 
    [0.201] [0.053] [0.047] [0.059] 
Observations  15146 15146 15146 15146 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
          Robust standard errors in brackets 
          * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 12 
Table 4 
Marginal effects 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Probability  0,504 0,504 0,504 0,504 
Age  18-25 0,067 0,072 0,073 0,069 
Age  26-40 0,099 0,108 0,108 0,101 
Age  41-60 0,132 0,143 0,140 0,133 
Educa2*  0,033 0,031 0,030 0,023 
Educa3*  0,037 0,047 0,044 0,043 
Educa4*  0,071 0,063 0,068 0,065 
Educa5*  0,090 0,093 0,090 0,092 
Selfemp  -0,018 -0,028 -0,021 -0,019 
Inscale  -0,018 -0,015 -0,015 -0,016 
Catholic  -0,036 -0,030 -0,018 -0,021 
GDPpc  0,112     
GINI     -0,067     -0,054 
TI     0,045  0,038 